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PREVIEW; State v. Walker:
Evidentiary Challenges in Sexual Crimes
Riley Wavra

Oral arguments are scheduled for Wednesday, August 8, 2018 at
9:30 A.M in the Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court in
Helena, Montana. Quentin M. Rhoades is expected to argue on
behalf of the Appellant, Randall Bryce Walker (“Mr. Walker”),
while Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Wellenstein, is
expected to argue on behalf of the State of Montana (“State”).
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents the Court with three distinct evidentiary
issues that could expand the evidence available to defendants
during the prosecution of sexual crimes. The Court must first
determine if the district court properly excluded evidence of Mr.
Walker’s psychosexual makeup.1 Second, the Court must
determine whether the district court properly applied Montana’s
Rape Shield Statute.2 Finally, the Court must determine whether
the district court erroneously excluded Mr. Walker’s polygraphrelated evidence.3
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties agree that on the morning of February 14,
2015, Mr. Walker’s step-daughter, R.W., awoke in her bedroom,
entered her parent’s bedroom and climbed into bed next to her
stepfather.4 Mr. Walker and R.W. were home alone.5 R.W. later
told a family friend, Hannah Billet, that while in the bed, Mr.
Walker sexually abused her.6 The incident was reported to the
Ravalli County Sheriff’s Office.7 Mr. Walker has continually
Appellant’s Principal Brief at 1, State v. Walker,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/9/1277/url/321Z246_03W91
0E6F001MRG.pdf (Mont. Oct. 23, 2017) (No. DA 17-0045).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.at 8; Brief of Appellee at 3, State v. Walker,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/385/url/321Z24V_04E6W
YVSR00007M.pdf (Mont. Apr. 27, 2018) (No. DA 17-0045).
5
Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 7; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4,
at 3.
6
Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 6; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4,
at 5–6.
7
Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 6.
1
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denied that anything sexual happened, and instead asserts that on
the morning of February 14, R.W. entered the bed and made sexual
advances towards him which he immediately rejected.8
The State charged Mr. Walker with incest on April 6,
2015. On July 22, 2015, Mr. Walker’s step-daughter from a
former marriage, A.W., accused him of sexually abusing her from
ages 7 to 12.10 The State subsequently amended the original
Information, adding an additional charge of incest for Mr.
Walker’s alleged sexual abuse of A.W. and a count of sexual
assault for each episode.11 A jury trial ensued, during which
several family members and friends provided testimony in support
of either R.W., A.W., or Mr. Walker.12 No physical evidence
including DNA, bodily fluids, or physical manifestations of the
alleged abuse was introduced.13 On August 19, 2016, Mr. Walker
was convicted on all counts and sentenced to four 100-year
concurrent sentences.14
9

III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant Randall B. Walker
Mr. Walker argues that the district court’s exclusion of his
expert witness, Dr. Robert Page, was trial error that the prosecution
cannot show to be harmless.15 Dr. Page would have testified that
the results of Mr. Walker’s psychosexual evaluation showed he
was not sexually attracted to children.16 Mr. Walker argues such
evidence is relevant because “knowingly having sexual contact
with two different pre-adolescent girls” is an essential element of
what the State had to prove.17 Further, Dr. Page’s testimony would
make it less probable that Mr. Walker knowingly had sexual
contact with the alleged victims.18 Finally, Mr. Walker contends
that the district court incorrectly concluded that such evidence
would be used for the improper purpose of bolstering his own
credibility, as Dr. Page would only have testified as to his clinical
Id. at 7–8.; Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 4–5.
Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 1.
10
Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 11.
11
Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 1–2.
12
Id. at 4–13; Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 2–15.
13
Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 21.
16
Id. at 22.
17
Id. at 23.
18
Id. at 23–24, 27.
8
9
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findings without evaluating the truthfulness of either Mr. Walker
or the alleged victims.19
Next, Mr. Walker argues that the district court erroneously
excluded testimony about R.W.’s past sexual history, claiming that
it mechanically applied Montana’s Rape Shield Statute as if it was
a per se ban on any sexual history of a victim.20 According to Mr.
Walker, the district court should have balanced the competing
interests of the victim and himself before excluding the evidence.21
The proffered evidence involved an incident in which R.W.
allegedly touched her step-cousins private parts in a sexual
manner. 22 Mr. Walker argues that evidence of R.W.’s prior sexual
history would have supported his theory that on the morning the
alleged abuse occurred, R.W. was acting out in a sexual manner.23
Finally, Mr. Walker argues that the district court erred in
excluding the results of his polygraph examination, which would
have been presented in the form of expert testimony by the test’s
examiner, Dick Stotts.24 Mr. Walker contends that the district court
incorrectly enforced a per se ban on polygraph evidence rather
than treating it as they would any other form of expert witness
testimony.25 In support of this contention, Mr. Walker points out
that Montana’s statutory ban on polygraph evidence was repealed
in 1994.26 Therefore, Mr. Walker argues the district court should
follow Montana’s pattern of admitting even “shaky” expert
evidence and let the jury assimilate, assess, and apply the
testimony.27
B. Appellee State of Montana
The State asserts that the district court correctly excluded
the expert testimony of Dr. Page.28 The State maintains that such
testimony would have improperly bolstered Mr. Walker’s
credibility by indirectly supporting his assertion that he did not
Id. at 27; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, State v. Walker,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/1/373/url/321Z25S_053VM7
F9W000038.pdf (Mont. May 25, 2018) (No. DA 17-0045).
20
Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 35-36.
21
Id. at 36.
22
Id. at 37.
23
Id. at 38.
24
Id. at 2, 40.
25
Id. at 43; Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 11–12.
26
Appellant’s Principal Brief, supra note 1, at 42.
27
Id. at 46–47.
28
Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 18–28.
19
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engage in sexual contact with the victims.29 Further, the State
asserts that such testimony would have improperly attacked the
validity of the victim’s allegations that they were sexually abused
by Mr. Walker.30
Next, the State contends that the district court properly
applied Montana’s Rape Shield Statute when it excluded evidence
of R.W.’s prior sexual history.31 In support, the State argues that
the district court’s application was not improper because they
heard argument from both parties on the evidence’s admissibly
prior to excluding it.32 That is, the district court did not exclude the
evidence on the basis that it was per se inadmissible, but rather on
the basis of the arguments made by each party.
The State also asserts that Mr. Walker has changed his
argument on appeal, now arguing that such evidence would have
supported his theory that R.W. was acting out in a sexual manner
on the morning in question.33 The State maintains that Mr. Walker
argued below that such evidence was necessary to refute the
State’s theory that R.W. was sexually aware because of his
abuse.34 Lastly, the State maintains that Mr. Walker sought to
introduce the evidence for the improper purpose of making “his
trial a trial of R.W.’s alleged prior sexual conduct.”35
Finally, the State argues that the district court correctly
excluded the polygraph-related evidence.36 The State asserts that
the Court has consistently held that polygraph evidence is not
admissible.37 The State contends that since the Legislature repealed
Montana’s per se ban on polygraph evidence this conclusion has
been reached several times.38 Therefore, the State argues that the
district court did not rely on a repealed statute, but rather on the
longstanding legal principle in Montana that polygraph evidence is
inadmissible.39

29

Id. at 28.
Id. at 26.
31
Id. at 28–38.
32
Id. at 34.
33
Id. at 36.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 38.
36
Id. at 38–39.
37
Id. at 38.
38
Id. at 38–39.
39
Id. at 39.
30
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Psychosexual Evidence
The admissibility of Dr. Page’s expert testimony poses a
difficult question for the Court. Expert testimony may not be
offered specifically to bolster the credibility of a party or their
claims.40 The parties do not dispute this rule, rather they disagree
on whether the testimony in question would have done so. This
presents to the Court what appears to be a novel question: may
expert testimony be offered if it would inadvertently bolster the
credibility of a party.
Mr. Walker maintains that Dr. Page’s testimony would not
have included direct commentary on anyone’s credibility.41
Nonetheless, such testimony would have bolstered Mr. Walker’s
claim that he did not engage in sexual contact with R.W. or A.W.,
albeit not directly. The policy behind excluding such evidence is
that it would improperly invade the province of the jury by
“placing a stamp of scientific legitimacy on a victim's allegations,
or by dismissing the validity of the allegations.”42 This remains a
compelling basis for exclusion. Because the proposed testimony
would have eroded the credibility of R.W. and A.W.’s allegations
that they were sexually abused while simultaneously bolstering
Mr. Walker’s own claim of innocence, the Court will likely affirm
the district court’s ruling.
B. Montana’s Rape Shield Statute
The Court will likely hold that the district court properly
applied Montana’s Rape Shield Statute. Both parties correctly note
that Montana’s Rape Shield Statute cannot be applied
mechanistically.43 Rather, courts must balance the defendant’s
right to present a defense with the victim’s right to protection
under the statute.44 Speculative or unsupported statements of a
victim’s prior sexual history are not enough to tip the scales in

40

State v. Bailey, 87 P.3d 1032, 1039 (Mont. 2004) (emphasis added).
Appellant’s Principle Brief, supra note 1, at 21, 24.
42
Benjamin v. Torgerson, 985 P.2d 734, 740 (Mont. 1999) (internal citations
omitted).
43
Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 32; Appellant’s Principle Brief, supra note
1, at 36; State v. Colburn, 366 P.3d 258, 263 (Mont. 2016).
44
Colburn, 336 P.3d at 263 (citing State v. Lindberg, 196 P.3d 1252, 1264
(Mont. 2008)).
41
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favor of admissibility.45 Further, Montana’s Rape Shield Statute
enumerates its exceptions, providing that evidence of past sexual
conduct of the victim is only admissible if it: (1) involves sexual
conduct with the alleged offender; or (2) is offered to “show the
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease that is at issue in the
prosecution.”46
The evidence Mr. Walker sought to have admitted was an
unsupported secondhand account of the incident.47 This stands in
contrast to Colburn, where the Court concluded that the proposed
prior sexual history evidence was neither speculative nor
unsupported as the victim’s father was convicted on charges
stemming from the abuse.48 Further, the district court heard
argument for and against the admission of the evidence prior to
excluding it.49 That is not an improper application. Additionally,
the evidence does not fit into either of the statutorily enumerated
exceptions to the inadmissibility of prior sexual history evidence in
Montana. Finally, if the State is correct in its assertion that Mr.
Walker has changed his argument in favor of admission on appeal,
then the Court will not consider it.50 It is unlikely that the Court
will overturn the district court’s ruling.
C. Polygraph Evidence
The Court will likely affirm the district court’s exclusion of
polygraph-related evidence. The Montana Supreme Court has
resisted the use of polygraph evidence in any Montana court
proceeding, long after the repeal of Montana’s per se statutory ban
in 1994.51 While Mr. Walker correctly notes that Montana no
longer has a per se statutory ban on polygraph-related evidence,
the Court has strongly adhered to the legal principle that such
evidence is inadmissible in Montana. These subsequent decisions
45

State v. Awbery, 367 P.3d 346, 350 (Mont. 2016); Lindberg, 196 P.3d at 1264
(Mont. 2008); State v. Johnson, 958 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Mont. 1998); State v.
Rhyne, 833 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Mont. 1992); State v. Laird, 732 P.2d 417, 420
(Mont. 1987).
46
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–5–511(2).
47
Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 37; Appellant’s Principle Brief, supra note
1, at 37.
48
336 P.3d at 263.
49
Brief of Appellee, supra note 4, at 34.
50
State v. Henderson, 877 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Mont. 1994) (holding that it is
axiomatic that a party may not advance a novel argument on appeal).
51
State v. Hameline, 188 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Mont. 2008); In re N.V., 87 P.3d
510, 514 (Mont. 2004); State v. DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 263 (Mont. 2003); State
v. Anderson, 977 P.2d 315, 317 (Mont. 1999); In re Marriage of Njos, 889 P.2d
1192, 1197 (Mont. 1995).
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have been rendered without reliance on the now-repealed statute.
The Court is unlikely to deviate from their prior decisions in this
case.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court will likely affirm all three of the district court’s
evidentiary rulings. Dr. Page’s testimony would have improperly
bolstered the credibility of Mr. Walker while attacking the validity
of the victims’ allegations. The district court properly applied
Montana’s Rape Shield Statute, and the proffered evidence does
not meet any of the enumerated exceptions to Montana’s ban on
such evidence. Finally, Montana’s jurisprudence suggests the
Court will affirm the exclusion of the polygraph-related evidence.

